MICHIGAN LAW-THE CASE FOR GIVING DRIVER'S LICENSES TO THE BLIND

In the Alice in Wonderland world of Michigan premise liability law, things have become so bizarre lately that I have resorted to arguing the case of Lugo v Ameritech, 464 Mich 512 (2001), in support of my position that certain "Open and Obvious" summary disposition motions should be denied.  I have tried this tactic three times.  It has worked twice and the third attempt has been taken under advisement.  Modesty and time forbids me from going into the details at this point.

For those who may not know the Lugo case, it is the decision by which the Republican majority of the Michigan Supreme Court announced that all cement irregularities were open and obvious hazards as a matter of law, and Michigan landowners/business owners had no duty to warn or protect their customers or visitors therefrom.  In addition, the decision held, again as a matter of law, that it could not be reasonably expected that a person could sustain a serious injury from a slip and fall--reality, apparently, nothwithstanding.

The rulings that have come from Michigan Courts, state and federal, since Lugo, have become progressively more tragic/comic.  For instance, within the last month the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled as a matter of law that a snow covered ice condition was an open and obvious hazard to the invitee who had just arrived at the premises, and amazingly that the owner of the 24-hour operation had no idea that there was snow and/or ice on the premises at the time of the accident.  See Blue v St. John Hospital and Medical Center, Michigan Court of Appeals No. 284769.   Wow.

But, perhaps strangest application of the Michigan "Open and Obvious" doctrine are the cases where conditions like water on the floor have been held to be open and obvious--to blind people.  See Lauff v Walmart, a 2002 case out of the US District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and Sidorowicz v Chicken Shack, 469 Mich 912 (2003).  In both cases, the blind plaintiff's were held to the same standard of observation and conduct as a sighted person.

So, then, if the Michigan common law standard of reasonable conduct holds that the blind person has the same abilities and responsibilities as a sighted person, how can the state then deny a blind person the right to drive a car on the streets and highways of our state?  The standard of reasonable care in driving a car is the same standard of reasonable care a person must exercise in life outside of an automobile.  If no allowances are made for blindness outside of an automobile, how can we impose restrictions on a blind person who might want to drive a car?  Are we denying our blind citizens equal protection of the law?  We impose responsibilities on them but deny them the corresponding rights?  The heavens cry out for justice, etc.

Sound stupid?  It does, and I won't belabor a stupid point as I have more important things to do right now, like raking leaves.  But giving driver's licenses to the blind is about as enlightened as the decisions of Michigan Courts that are now the law of the land.

Does Michigan premises liability law make sense?  Go ask Alice.

Comments

[Dick Stolcenberg]

Ok Michael-- I'm intrigued. I have a "Lugo" motion coming up soon. I like your logic-- or pointing out the "lack thereof" to Quote my father. This line of cases (and line of purported thought for that matter) truly condemns the civil justice system as simply a farce. If you have successfully fended off an open and obvious SD motion using "Lugo"-- I'd like to see your analysis. It's about time we mear mortals turn this around and restore the Justice system to what it has always been intended to do; Blindly provide "Justice" to all citizens.

[Mike Butler]

Dick, thanks for the comment. I sent you a private response offering to discuss this issue with you. Best of luck.